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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between dynamic consistency and the
existing notions of unambiguous events for Choquet expected utility prefer-
ences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by
a filtration. We show that the decision maker’s preferences respect dynamic
consistency on a fixed filtration if and only if the last stage of the filtration
is composed of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (1999). Adopting
two axioms, conditional certainty equivalence consistency and constrained dy-
namic consistency to filtration measurable acts, it is shown that the decision
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to explore the link between updating nonexpected
utility preferences and existing notions of unambiguous events. Nonexpected utility
preferences are widely used in modeling ambiguity averse behavior, as exemplified
by the famous Ellsberg (1961) paradox. Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory
is a prominent class of such preferences. As a decision criterion it was axiomat-
ically justified, in different frameworks, by Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa (1987) and
Sarin and Wakker (1992). According to this theory, decision makers’ beliefs are
represented by capacities, which are not necessarily additive probabilities. To make
nonexpected utility models attractive for economic and game theoretic applications
it is important to know how well do they perform in dynamic choice situations. In
this contribution we ask whether for CEU preferences the property of dynamic con-
sistency, constrained to a given collection of events, guarantees that its elements are
unambiguous and vice versa. The results we obtain allow us to answer this question
in the affirmative.
Recently, several extensions of CEU preferences to intertemporal decision making
have been proposed (see e.g. Machina (1989), Sarin andWakker (1998a), Eichberger,
Grant, and Kelsey (2005), Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007)). In dynamic choice
situations the decision maker (henceforth DM) receives new information, updates
preferences, and formulates a new plan of action. A fundamental question raised
in this context is how updated preferences that govern future choices are linked to
contingent choices made ex ante. Two axioms are used to justify the link: dynamic
consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that choices made
ex ante are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism requires that after
being informed that some event occurred, the conditional preferences are not affected
by outcomes outside of that event. When preferences satisfy both axioms simulta-
neously on all events, then the DM’s beliefs are probabilistic and the updating rule
coincides with the Bayes revision rule. This result was obtained in the presence of
risk by Hammond (1988) and in the presence of uncertainty by Ghirardato (2002)
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and belongs today to the ‘folk wisdom’ of the decision theory. However, as the
following dynamic version of the classical 3-color Ellsberg experiment illustrates, it
is impossible to retain both rationality arguments on all events in the presence of
ambiguity. As a mind experiment it was described by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci (2008) and Siniscalchi (2009). Recently, Dominiak, Du¨rsch, and Lefort
(2009) ran a real experiment on this issue.
Example 1.1. The DM maker faces an urn containing 90 balls, 30 of which are
known to be red {R} and 60 of which are somehow divided between blue {B} and
yellow {Y }, with no further information on the distribution. At the ex ante stage
(t = 0) the DM only has the information as described above. Suppose that at the
interim stage (t = 1) one ball is drawn from the urn at random, and then the DM is
informed that the ball is not yellow, i.e. {R,B}. The DM has to choose between two
bets (f, f ′) and (g, g′) paying off 100 or 0, depending on the color of the randomly
drawn ball. Suppose that at the ex ante stage (t = 0) the DM, like a majority
of subjects in experimental studies (see Camarer and Weber (1992)), displays the
following patterns of preferences:
f =

100 if ω ∈ R
0 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ Y
 

0 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ Y
 = f ′
g =

100 if ω ∈ R
0 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ Y
 ≺

0 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ Y
 = g′
A DM displaying such preferences is reluctant to bet on events with unknown prob-
abilities and therefore she is said to be averse toward ambiguity. Now consider the
interim stage (t = 1) and the possible patterns of conditional preferences, ({R,B}),
which respect dynamic consistency, (i), and which respect consequentialism, (ii).
(i) According to the property of dynamic consistency the DM’s conditional prefer-
ences have to respect the choices made ex ante, i.e. f {R,B} f ′ and g ≺{R,B}
g′.
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(ii) According to consequentialism, since the bets f, g and f ′, g′ are the same on the
event {R,B} and differ only outside that event, the DM must be conditionally
indifferent between them, i.e. f ∼{R,B} g and f ′ ∼{R,B} g′. Furthermore,
consequentialism implies that if f {R,B} f ′, then g {R,B} g′ and vice versa
(respectively if f ≺{R,B} f ′, then g ≺{R,B} g′ and vice versa).
It can be immediately seen that in dynamic situations an ambiguity averse DM must
violate either the property of dynamic consistency or consequentialism (or both).
Then, if conditional preferences respect dynamic consistency, as in (i), the property
of consequentialism is violated. On the other hand, if the conditional preferences
remain consistent with consequentialism, as in (ii), exactly one of the ex ante pref-
erences is reversed, what violates dynamic consistency.1
As an immediate consequence, when extending nonexpected utility models to
dynamic frameworks, we must either relax the property of dynamic consistency or
consequentialism, or we may maintain both rationality arguments, but, constrain
the analysis to some fixed collection of events. We follow the latter direction and
characterize the properties of events on which dynamic consistency and consequen-
tialism are satisfied. A natural candidate for events on which both axioms are
satisfied, are events that support some kind of probabilistic beliefs, as for instance
events with known distribution, i.e. {R} and {B, Y } in the example above. The
idea of events characterized by probabilistic beliefs is closely related to the recently
suggested notions of unambiguous events by Nehring (1999), Epstein and Zhang
(2001), Zhang (2002) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004).
First, we focus on the definition by Nehring (1999), since it mimics the desir-
able separability property of expected utility theory.2 His definition is based on the
idea, originated by Sarin and Wakker (1998b), to interpret capacities in terms of
1If conditionally on the event {R,B} the DM reverses both ex ante preferences, i.e. f ≺{R,B} f ′
and g {R,B} g′, then such DM is inconsistent with dynamic consistency and consequentialism.
2Separability of preferences and beliefs is a key property of expected utility theory. It means
that subjective probabilities assigned to uncertain events are not affected by outcomes that are
associated to these events.
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rank dependent probability assignments. According to this interpretation, subjective
probabilities used for evaluating acts depend on the rank ordering of their conse-
quences. In general two acts generating distinct ranks are evaluated with respect
to different subjective probabilities. Thus, the separability of preferences and be-
liefs may be achieved for acts that generate the same rank. Such acts are called
comonotonic. In the case that the subjective likelihood of an event is unaffected by
changing its position, it must be viewed as unambiguous. Correspondingly, Nehring
(1999) calls an event unambiguous, henceforth N-unambiguous, if the subjective
probability attached to the event does not depend on the ranking position of states.
We argue that conditional on N -unambiguous events, the Bayes revision rule
for capacities is the most appropriate updating rule. The reason is twofold. First,
because updating on N -unambiguous events according to the Bayes rule is the only
way to retain dynamic consistency. Second, when conditioning on N -unambiguous
events, the Bayesian updating rule coincides with other popular updating rules.
These include the Full-Bayesian updating rule introduced by Jaffray (1992) and
all h-Bayesian updating rules as axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
Motivated by this rationale we show that consequentialist Choquet expected utility
preferences satisfy dynamic consistency on a fixed filtration if and only if the algebra
generated by the smallest elements in the filtration belongs to an algebra generated
by N -unambiguous events. This result on its own may be viewed as an alternative
characterization of N -unambiguous events in a conditional decision problem.
Furthermore, Nehring (1999) emphasized the restrictiveness of CEU preferences,
since the collection of N -unambiguous events must be always an algebra. However,
there may be potentially interesting ambiguity situations, as exemplified by Zhang
(2002) in his 4-color example, in which the candidates for unambiguous events form a
weaker structure. By departing from the intuition behind Savage’s key axiom, called
Sure-Thing-Principle, Zhang (2002) suggested a weaker definition of unambiguous
events, henceforth Z-unambiguous. Thus, it is impossible to maintain dynamic con-
sistency on events that are Z-unambiguous. An ilustrating dynamic extension of
the 4-color example is given in Section 5. Adopting an axiom, called conditional
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certainty equivalence consistency and constraining the dynamic consistency to par-
tition measurable acts, we provide a dynamic characterization of Z-unambiguous
events in a conditional decision problem.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary notation.
In Section 3 the definitions of N -unambiguous events and Z-unambiguous events
are introduced. Section 4 presents the main concepts regarding the conditional
decision problem. In Section 5 we provide a characterization of N -unambiguous
events in a conditional decision problem. Moreover, we make some remarks on the
related literature and provide an illustrative example. A dynamic characterization
of Z-unambiguous events is given in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Notation
The uncertainty, which the DM faces, is described by a finite set of states of nature,
Ω. An event A is a subset of Ω. The algebra generated by Ω is denoted by A. For all
A ⊂ Ω, we denote Ω\A, the complement of A, by Ac. Let X be the set of outcomes.
An act f is a function from Ω to X. For instance, an act f = (A1, x1; . . . ;An, xn)
assigns the outcome xj to each ω ∈ Aj, j = 1, . . . , n, where A1, . . . , An are events
partitioning Ω. Let fAg be an act that assigns the outcome f(ω) to each ω ∈ A and
the outcome g(ω) to each ω ∈ Ac. An act f = x that assigns a constant outcome to
each ω ∈ Ω is called a constant act. Denote the set of all acts by F . A set function
ν : A → R is called capacity if it satisfies the following conditions: (1) ν(∅) = 0
and ν(Ω) = 1; (2) if A ⊂ B ⊂ Ω, then ν(A) ≤ ν(B). Let  be a binary relation
on the set of acts, F , that represents preferences. The DM is said to have Choquet
expected utility preferences, if there exists a utility function u : X → R and a
capacity ν such that, for all f, g ∈ F , f  g if and only if ∫
Ω
u ◦ fdν ≥ ∫
Ω
u ◦ gdν.
Formally, expected utility of an act f with respect to the utility index u and the
capacity ν is defined as:∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν = u(f(A1)) +
n∑
i=2
[u(f(Ai))− u(f(Ai−1))] ν(Ai, . . . , An)
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with {Ai}i=1,...,n chosen such that u(f(A1)) ≤ u(f(A2)) ≤ · · · ≤ u(f(An)). Schmei-
dler (1989), Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) axiomatized CEU prefer-
ences for a infinite state space. Assuming a rich set of consequences and allowing for
a finite state space CEU preferences were axiomatized by Wakker (1989), Nakamura
(1990) and Chew and Karni (1994).
Throughout the paper we assume that preferences are represented by CEU. Ad-
ditionally we restrict the set of outcomes X and preferences  on F by assuming
that:
Assumption 1 (Continuity) The utility function u : X → R is continuous.
Assumption 2 (Solvability) For any f ∈ F there exists x ∈ X such that f ∼ x.
Solvability serves as a richness condition on  and X. It is satisfied in all
axiomatizations of CEU in finite state space set-up. For instance, Nakamura (1990)
and Chew and Karni (1994) impose it directly on  , while Wakker (1989) requires
X to be a connected and separable topological space.
3 Unambiguous events
This section provides a behavioral characterization of unambiguous events. We begin
with the characterization suggested by Nehring (1999), who interprets capacities in
terms of rank dependent probability assignments. Let ρ be a bijection ρ : Ω →
{n, . . . , 1}. The mapping ρ expresses the ranking position of states associated with
an act f , i.e. the favorableness of their outcome relative to the outcomes obtained
under other states. LetR be a set of such rankings and let ∆Ω be a set of probability
distributions over Ω. Furthermore, we say that ρ is a neighbor of ranking ρ′, written
ρNρ′, if and only if for at most two states ω ∈ Ω, ρ(ω) = ρ′(ω), and for all ω ∈ Ω,
|ρ(ω) − ρ′(ω)| ≤ 1. A mapping m : R → ∆Ω is called rank dependent probability
assignment if and only if for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ R such that ρNρ′, and all ω ∈ Ω such that
ρ(ω) = ρ′(ω): mρ(ω) = mρ′(ω). For a given capacity ν on Ω the rank dependent
probability assignmentmρ may be defined as followsmρ(ω) = ν(ω
′ : ρ(ω′) ≤ ρ(ω))−
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ν(ω′ : ρ(ω′) < ρ(ω)).3 The mapping mρ may be interpreted as the marginal capacity
contribution of the state ω to all states yielding better outcomes. The Choquet
integral of an act f with respect to ν and u can be written as the Choquet integral
with respect to mρ and u, i.e.:∫
Ω
u◦f dν =
∫
Ω
u◦f dmρ = u(f(A1))+
n∑
i=2
[u(f(Ai))− u(f(Ai−1))]mρ(Ai, . . . , An).
By abuse of notation we denote a measure mρ(f), such that mρ(f)(Ai, . . . , An) =
v(Ai, . . . , An) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as the rank dependent probability assignment mρ
associated with an act f . Thus, throughout the paper we write the Choquet expec-
tation of f , taken with respect the measure mρ(f), as
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν = ∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
Call a pair of acts f and g comonotonic, if there are no two states ω, ω′ such that
f(ω) < f(ω′) and g(ω) > g(ω′). For any act g, comonotonic with f and measurable
with respect to f , the Choquet integral of g with respect to ν and u is equal to the
expectation of g with respect to mρ(f) and u.
According to this interpretation, an event A is called N-unambiguous if its rank
dependent probability assignment does not depend on its ranking.
Definition 3.1. Fix an event A ∈ A. A is N-unambiguous if mρ(A) = ν(A) for all
ρ ∈ R, otherwise A is N-ambiguous.
Let AUN be the set of all N -unambiguous events. Nehring (1999) proves that
for any capacity ν the set AUN is an algebra. Moreover, any capacity ν is always
additively separable across its unambiguous events. Thus, AUN = {A|v(B) = v(B ∩
A) + v(B ∩ Ac) for all B ∈ A}. An alternative way to define N -unambiguous
events is to use Savage’s axiom called Sure-Thing-Principle. However, since the
Sure-Thing-Principle, applied to the whole algebra of events A, implies that beliefs
are probabilistic, we have to constrain its domain to some events. Thus, we say that
the Sure-Thing-Principle holds at A and Ac if and only if for any act f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ F :
if fDg  f ′Dg, then fDg′  f ′Dg′ and D ∈ {A,Ac}.
3Nehring (1999) showed that there is a one-to-one relation between capacities and rank depen-
dent probability assignments, mρ. In his definition the superscript ν is used for mνρ. We drop it
for notational simplicity.
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Proposition 3.1. Fix an event A ∈ A. The following two statements are equivalent:
i) A is N-unambiguous, i.e. A ∈ AUN .
ii) The Sure-Thing-Principle at A and Ac is satisfied.
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) provide the behavioral counter-
part to N -unambiguous events in a different set up, assuming a convex structure
on the set of consequences. In particular, an event A is N -unambiguous if for any
x, x′ ∈ X bets of the form xAx′ cannot not be used for hedging other acts. According
to their proposition 10 all such bets (called crisp acts) are evaluated with respect to
the same probability distribution. Thus, the measure of an event A, mρ(xAx′)(A), is
independent of the rank ρ, meaning that A is N -unambiguous event.
Zhang (2002) constrains Savage’s Sure-Thing-Principle and proposes a weaker
definition of unambiguous events. An event A is Z -unambiguous if replacing a
common outcome for all states in A by any other outcomes does not change the
ranking of the pair of acts being compared. The following definition reflects this
idea.
Definition 3.2. An event A ∈ A is Z-unambiguous if for any f, g ∈ F , x ∈ X
fAx  gAx⇒ fAx′  gAx′
for any x′ ∈ X and the same implication holds for Ac. Otherwise A is Z-ambiguous.
Let AUZ be a set of all Z -unambiguous events. It is well known that AUN ⊆ AUZ ,
since AUZ does not need to be an algebra.4 Furthermore, Zhang (2002) estab-
lished the following characterization of AUZ in terms of capacities. An event A
is Z-unambiguous if and only if v(A ∪ B) = v(A) + v(B) for all B ⊂ Ac and
v(Ac ∪ C) = v(Ac) + v(C) for all C ⊂ A.
4Kopylov (2007) showed that AUZ is weaker than originally claimed λ-systems, it is a mosaic.
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4 Information and Updating
We limit our attention to updating on events that the DM views as possible to
occur, i.e. non null events. An event A ∈ A is non null if ν(A) > 0.5 As time
progresses the DM is informed that the true state of the nature ω is an element of
an event A, i.e. ω ∈ A. A natural way to model information is by means of event
trees represented by a filtration. We assume that time is discrete, finite and goes
over the index set T = {0, . . . , T}. Let Pt be a partition of the state space Ω. A
filtration P = {Pt}t∈T is a collection of partitions such that P0 = {Ω}, any Pt+1 is
finer than Pt for all t < T , and PT = {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}. A filtration is given and fixed
throughout. Let AP be the algebra generated by the smallest elements of a given
filtration P .
At the ex ante stage, t = 0, the DM formulates a complete contingent plan of
action. When no information is given, the relation  represents the DM’s uncondi-
tional preferences, that is  is equivalent to Ω. At any interim stage, t < T , the
DM faces new information and has a chance to review the contingent plan for the
remaining time periods. We denote by A the CEU preferences over F conditional
on A ∈ Pt, i.e. for all f, g ∈ F ,
f A g ⇔
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA ≥
∫
Ω
u ◦ gdνA
with νA a capacity conditional on A. As in Ghirardato (2002) we reduce conditional
decision problems to static ones.
In a dynamic framework it is important to know how the conditional and the
unconditional preferences are related to each other. The following three axioms
impose dynamic restrictions on preferences over F . The first property, called con-
sequentialism, concerns only the conditional preference relation. It requires that
preferences conditional on a non null event A are not affected by outcomes outside
the conditional event, Ac. Intuitively, once the DM is informed that an event A
occurred, only the uncertainty about all subevents of A matters for preferences.
5When an event A is either N -unambiguous or Z-unambiguous this definition of null events is
equivalent to the stronger notion, A is null if ν(A ∪B) = ν(B) for any B ∈ A.
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The uncertainty about counterfactual events, Ac, is not relevant anymore for future
choices.
Axiom 4.1 (Consequentialism). For any non null A ∈ A and all f, g ∈ F , f(ω) =
g(ω) for each ω ∈ A implies f ∼A g.
Throughout the paper, we assume that preferences satisfy consequentialism. An
important axiom linking directly conditional and unconditional preferences is called
dynamic consistency. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices
are respected by updated preferences and vice versa.
Axiom 4.2 (Dynamic consistency). For any non null A ∈ A and all f, g ∈ F such
that f(ω) = g(ω) for each ω ∈ Ac, f  g ⇔ f A g .
Essentially, when the DM prefers f to g without any information regarding A,
and f and g are the same outside of A, she should also prefer f to g after being
informed that A occurred and vice versa.
The third property, called conditional certainty equivalent consistency, is adapted
from Pires (2002).6 This property is a weaker version of dynamic consistency. It
states: if conditional on a non null event A, the DM is indifferent between the act f
and the constant payment x, then the unconditional preferences should also express
indifference between the outcome x and the act fAx, which agrees with the act f on
A and otherwise assigns the constant outcome x.
Axiom 4.3 (Conditional certainty equivalent consistency). For any non null A ∈ A
any outcome x ∈ X and any f ∈ F , f ∼A x ⇔ fAx ∼ x.
At the interim stage, the revealed information is taken into account by updating
the DM’s subjective beliefs. For CEU preferences, there are several ways of defining
the conditional capacity νA. The most common updating rules used to revise ca-
pacities are: the Bayes update, the Dempster-Shafer update and the Full-Bayesian
update. For the sake of completeness, we recall the respective definitions.
6In her paper Pires (2002) axiomatizes the Full-Bayesian updating rule for the multiple prior
preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
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Definition 4.1. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ⊂ Ω. If A is observed and
B ⊂ A, then:
i) the Bayes update (B) is given by
νA(B) =
ν(B ∩ A)
ν(A)
,
ii) the Dempster-Shafer (DS) update of ν is given by
νDSA (B) =
ν((B ∩ A) ∪ Ac)− ν(Ac)
1− ν(Ac) ,
ii) the Full-Bayesian update (FB) is given by
νFBA (B) =
ν(B)
1− ν(B ∪ Ac) + ν(B ∩ A) .
Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007) provide an axiomatic characterization of
the Full-Bayesian update for CEU preferences. Moreover, the Dempster-Shafer and
the Bayes updating rule belong to the class of so called h-Bayesian updating rules
introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
Definition 4.2 (h-Bayesian update). There is an act h ∈ F such that for all
f, g ∈ F and all A ∈ A, f A g ⇔ fAh  gAh.
When preferences admit a CEU representation then for the Dempster-Shafer (or
pessimistic) update, the act h = x∗ is a constant act yielding the most preferred
outcome in X. That is, under the Dempster-Shafer update, the conditionally null
event, Ac, is associated with the best outcome possible. For the Bayes (or optimistic)
update the act h = x∗ is a constant act associating the worst possible outcome in
X (note that w.l.o.g. we suppose that such x∗ and x∗ exist). According to Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1993) the DM exhibits ‘happiness’ that an event A occurred and
decisions are made as if we were always in ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (‘happiness’
comes from the fact that the event Ac, which did not occur, was associated by the
DM with the worst outcome). All h-Bayesian updates satisfy consequentialism but
not necessarily dynamic consistency.
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5 N-Unambiguous Events in a Conditional Deci-
sion Problem
The objective of this section is to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions
for CEU preferences to be dynamically consistent on events in a fixed filtration. We
begin by looking for an appropriate updating rule on the filtration P made up of
N -unambiguous events, i.e. AP ∈ AUN . It turns out that the Bayes revision rule
for capacities is the only way to ensure dynamic consistency on the filtration P ,
whose elements are N -unambiguous events. Moreover, when the conditional event
is N -unambiguous, then the property of conditional certainty equivalent consistency
implies that beliefs are revised according to the Bayes rule. These observations are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUN be an N-unambiguous
event, then the following three statements are equivalent:
i) Conditional certainty equivalent consistency is satisfied.
ii) The capacity ν is updated according to Bayes rule.
iii) Dynamic consistency is satisfied.
Remark 5.1. Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2008) provide a similar re-
sult for a larger class of preferences than the class of CEU preferences, the invariant
biseparable preferences. However, the properties that they obtain are not available for
all acts but only for acts which are unambiguous (i.e. acts measurable with respect
to the unambiguous partition).
As next we state that the Full-Bayesian update and all h-Bayesian updates co-
incide with Bayes update when the conditional event A belongs to the algebra gen-
erated by N -unambiguous events, i.e. A ∈ AUN .
Proposition 5.2. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUN be an N-unambiguous
event, then the Full-Bayesian update and all h-Bayesian updates coincide with the
Bayes update.
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Now we are ready to state our first theorem. It claims that CEU preferences
satisfy dynamic consistency on events in a fixed filtration if and only if the algebra
generated by the events from that filtration belongs to the algebra generated by
N -unambiguous events. Intuitively, CEU preferences respect dynamic consistency
on a fixed collection of events, which are not affected by ambiguity.
Theorem 5.1. Let P = {Pt}t∈T be a fixed filtration on Ω and let AP be an algebra
generated by P. If the DM has CEU preferences then the following conditions are
equivalent:
i) The DM is dynamically consistent with respect to P.
ii) AP belongs to AUN and ν is updated according to the Bayes rule..
Some remarks regarding the theorem and the related literature are in order.
Remark 5.2. Our result extends the theorem of Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey
(2005), which is true only for convex capacities, to all capacities. Then, for a ca-
pacity ν being convex, the additivity on A ∈ A, i.e. ν(Ac) + ν(A) = 1, is equivalent
to A being N-unambiguous. The proof relies on their lemma 2.1 stating that if
ν(Ac) + ν(A) = 1, then for any B ∈ A, ν(B) = ν(Ac ∩ B) + ν(A ∩ B). Instead of
assuming the Bayesian updating rule as in Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005) we
show that it is actually the only way to retain the property of dynamic consistency.
Remark 5.3. Sarin and Wakker (1998a) show in their theorem 3.2 that dynamic
consistency is equivalent to the additivity of the Choquet functional. Our theorem
strengthens this result by showing that dynamic consistency on fixed filtration ac-
tually implies that the algebra generated by this filtration belongs to the algebra of
N-unambiguous events and vice versa.
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6 Dynamic Characterization of Z-unambiguous
events
We begin this section by presenting the 4-color experiment, suggested by Zhang
(2002), and extend it to a dynamic framework. In particular it ilustrates that con-
ditionally on a Z-unambiguous event (which is not N -unambiguous) it is impossible
that the consequentialist DM satisfies the property of dynamic consistency.
Example 6.1. Consider an urn containing 100 balls. The color of each ball may
be black (B), red (R), gray (G) or white (W). The DM is supposed to rank six acts,
f, f ′, g, g′, h, h′ ∈ F , which are defined as below. At the ex ante stage (t = 0) the
DM is told that that the sum of black and red balls is 50 and the sum of black and
gray is also 50. At interim stage (t = 1) one ball is drawn at random from the urn
and the DM is informed the event {B,R} occurred.
Suppose that at the ex ante stage (t = 0) the DM is ambiguity averse and displays
the following pattern of preferences:
f =

1 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ R
0 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 

100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ R
0 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 = f
′
g =

1 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 ≺

100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
0 if ω ∈ W
 = g
′
h =

1 if ω ∈ B
100 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
100 if ω ∈ W
 

100 if ω ∈ B
0 if ω ∈ R
100 if ω ∈ G
100 if ω ∈ W
 = h
′
The DM prefers f to f ′ and she also prefers h and h′, because the chance of
getting 100 by choosing f is the same as by choosing f ′, but also with additional
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chance of getting 1 under f . The same way of reasoning holds for the preference
relation between the act h and the act h′. Furthermore, the DM prefers g′ to g.
Choosing act g′ leads to the payment of 100 with probability of one half, since the
probability of the event {B,G} is known to be one half, whereas the act g pays 100
only with probability in the range between null and one half. Moreover, chang-
ing the outcome on event {G,W} in the pair of acts {f, f ′} and {h, h′} leaves
the preference relation between these acts unchanged. Thus, the event {B,R} is
Z-unambiguous. In particular the collection of all Z-unambiguous events, AUZ =
{∅, {B,R}, {G,W}, {B,G}, {R,W},Ω}, is not an algebra, since it is not closed un-
der intersections.
Consider now the filtration P = {P0,P1}, with P0 = Ω and P1 = {{B,R}, {G,W}}.
At the interim stage (t = 1) the DM is informed that the event {B,R} occurred.
Since all acts a, b ∈ {f, g, h} and all acts a′, b′ ∈ {f ′, g′, h′} are the same on the event
{B,R}, a = b and a′ = b′, and differ only outside of that event, consequentialism
requires that a ∼{A,B} b and a′ ∼{A,B} b′ and furthermore a {B,R} a′ (or a ≺{B,R} a′
respectively). But this is possible only by reversing the conditional preference rela-
tion between g and g′. Thus, it is impossible for the ambiguity averse DM to respect
dynamic consistency on fixed filtration P made up of Z-unambiguous events.
We maintain dynamic consistency for all acts measurable with respect to the
filtration P . That is for all f ∈ F such that for any x ∈ X, f−1(x) ∈ P . Denote by
FP the set of all acts measurable with respect to the filtration P .
Axiom 6.1 (P-Dynamic Consistency). For any non null event A ∈ A and for any
f, g ∈ FP , f ∼A g ⇔ fAg ∼ g.
In the same spirit as for N -unambiguous events, we look for the most natural
revision rule to update capacities conditionally on Z-unambiguous events. According
to the next result, applying the Bayes revision rule is the only way to ensure that
the conditional certainty equivalent consistency and the P-dynamic consistency are
satisfied.
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Proposition 6.1. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUZ be a Z-unambiguous
event, then the following two statements are equivalent:
i) The capacity ν is updated according to the Bayes rule.
ii) Conditional certainty equivalent consistency and P-dynamic consistency are
satisfied.
Next we show that conditional on Z-ambiguous events the Bayes rule coincides
with all h-Bayesian rules, whenever h is a constant act, and with the Full-Bayesian
update.
Proposition 6.2. Let ν be a capacity on Ω and let A ∈ AUZ be an Z-unambiguous
event, then the Full-Bayesian update and all h-Bayesian updates, with h = x for
some x ∈ X, coincide with the Bayes update.
In the following, we assume that the finest partition in P contains at least three
elements. Then we provide a necessary and sufficient condition Z-unambiguous
events in a conditional decision problem.
Theorem 6.1. Let P = {Pt}t∈T be a fixed filtration on Ω. If a decision maker has
CEU preferences then the following conditions are equivalent:
i) Conditional certainty equivalent consistency and P-dynamic consistency are sat-
isfied on P.
ii) AP belongs to AUZ and ν is updated according to the Bayes rule.
Remark 6.1. If conditional certainty equivalent consistency is satisfied but not P-
dynamic consistency, then the event fails to be Z-unambiguous. When updated ac-
cording to the Full-Bayes rule, the capacities known as -contamination respect con-
ditional certainty equivalent consistency. For a characterization of capacities which
satisfies the conditional certainty equivalent consistency on all events see Eichberger,
Grant, and Lefort (2009).
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Remark 6.2. This characterization of Z-unambiguous events through conditional
certainty equivalent consistency is a specific property of CEU preferences. For in-
stance when preferences admit the multiple prior representation, then according to
the result of Pires (2002) conditional certainty equivalent consistency holds on all
events whenever the Full-Bayesian updating rule is used.
7 Conclusion
In this paper the notion of unambiguous events is related to conditional decision
problems. We consider a consequentialist decision maker with Choquet expected
utility preferences. We look for a fixed collection of events on which the DM re-
spects dynamic consistency. It turns out that dynamic consistency satisfied on a
fixed filtration guarantees that its elements are N -unambiguous events. The con-
verse is also true, when the capacity is updated according the Bayes rule. As an
implication, the DM will in general violate dynamic consistency on events which
are Z-unambiguous (but not N -unambiguous). However, when the fixed filtration
is made up of Z-unambiguous the DM’s preferences respect an axiom called con-
ditional certainty equivalence consistency and dynamic consistency constrained to
partition measurable acts.
On the one side the tight structure of CEU models can be seen as a drawback of
these models. On the other side it allows to characterize sharply the usual dynamic
properties of preferences from the static point of view. We hope that these results on
their own may give some new insights into the nature of dynamic CEU preferences
and may also contribute to the existing debate regarding the suitable notion of
unambiguous events.
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A Appendix
Proposition 3.1. i)⇒ ii) Let A be a N -unambiguous event. Suppose that there are
four acts f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ F such that fAg  f ′Ag, but fAg′ ≺ f ′Ag′. By computing the
Choquet expectations of fAg we get∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAg) dν = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1)(ν(A) + ν(A
c))
+
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)](ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ A) + ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ Ac))
=
∫
A
u ◦ f dν +
∫
Ac
u ◦ g dν.
Furthermore after computing the Choquet expectations of f ′Ag, fAg
′, and f ′Ag
′ we
obtain ∫
A
u ◦ f dν ≥
∫
A
u ◦ f ′ dν
and ∫
A
u ◦ f dν <
∫
A
u ◦ f ′ dν
Thus we got a contradiction.
ii)⇒ i)
Step 1. Fix an event A ∈ A. For any act f ∈ F take an outcome x ∈ X such that
fAx ∼ x. Let mρ(fAx) be a rank dependent probability assignment for rank ρ
generated by fAx. Hence
∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAx) dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAx) dmρ(fAx). Take any
y ∈ X such that fAx and fAy are comonotonic. By the Sure-Thing-Principle
we have fAy ∼ xAy. After computing the Choquet integral we obtain∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAx) + u(x)mρ(fAx)(Ac) = u(x),
thus ∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAx) = u(x)mρ(fAx)(A).
Furthermore, whenever u(x) < u(y) we have
u(x)mρ(fAx)(A) + u(y)mρ(fAx)(A
c) = u(y)ν(Ac) + u(x)(1− ν(Ac)).
18
By continuity of u there are infinity many of such outcomes y and therefore
we get
ν(Ac) = mρ(fAx)(A
c).
Let now B ∈ A be an event such that B = {ω|f(ω)  x}, then
mρ(fAx)(A
c) = ν(Ac ∪B)− ν(B)
and
ν(Ac) = ν(Ac ∪B)− ν(B).
This holds for any B ∈ A such that B∩Ac = ∅. Since the Sure-Thing-Principle
is satisfied at Ac as well, then
ν(A) = ν(A ∪ C)− ν(C)
for any C ∈ A such that A ∩ C = ∅.
Step 2. For any x, z ∈ X such that u(x) < u(z), there exists a y ∈ X with u(x) <
u(y) < u(z) such that fAg ∼ f ′Ag where the acts fAg and f ′Ag are defined as
follows
fAg =

z if ω ∈ A ∩B
x if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
x if ω ∈ Ac
 and f ′Ag =

y if ω ∈ A ∩B
y if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
x if ω ∈ Ac
 .
By the Sure-Thing-Principle fAg ∼ f ′Ag ⇒ fAh ∼ f ′Ah for any fAh and f ′Ah
defined as
fAh =

z if ω ∈ A ∩B
x if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
z if ω ∈ Ac ∩B
x if ω ∈ Ac ∩Bc
 and f
′
Ah =

y if ω ∈ A ∩B
y if ω ∈ A ∩Bc
z if ω ∈ Ac ∩B
x if ω ∈ Ac ∩Bc
 .
19
Now by computing the Choquet integrals, we get
fAg = u(x)(1− ν(A ∩B)) + u(z)ν(A ∩B)
f ′Ag = u(x)(1− ν(A)) + u(y)ν(A)
fAh = u(x)(1− ν(B)) + u(z)ν(B)
f ′Ah = u(x)(1− ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩B))) + u(y)(ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩B))− ν(Ac ∩B))
+u(z)ν(Ac ∩B)
and since fAg ∼ f ′Ag we obtain
u(x)(1− ν(A ∩B)) + u(z)ν(A ∩B) = u(x)(1− ν(A)) + u(y)ν(A)
u(x)(ν(A)− ν(A ∩B)) = u(y)ν(A)− u(z)ν(A ∩B)
From Step 1 we have ν(A) = ν(A∪ (Ac∩B))−ν(Ac∩B) and since fAh ∼ f ′Ah
we obtain that
u(x)(ν(A ∪ (Ac ∩B))− ν(B)) = u(y)ν(A)− u(z)(ν(Ac ∩B)− ν(B))
Since this equation is true for any x, z ∈ X then ν(B) = ν(B∩A)+ν(B∩Ac),
for any B ∈ A and we conclude that A is aN -unambiguous event, i.e. A ∈ AUN .
Proposition 5.1. i) ⇒ ii) Let us suppose that conditional certainty equivalent con-
sistency is satisfied. Let f = yBx be a simple bet with u(x) < u(y). By solvability,
there is z ∈ X such that f ∼A z. Thus, by conditional certainty equivalent consis-
tency, we have fAz ∼ z. After rearranging terms, we get:
u(z) = u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B)
u(z) = u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(z)(ν(Ac ∪ (B ∩ A))− ν(B)) + u(y)ν(B ∩ A)
Thus,
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) .
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Since A is a N -unambiguous event, then by the property of additive separability,
we get 1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(B) = 1− ν(Ac)− ν(A∩B) + ν(A∩B) = ν(A). Thus, for
any outcomes x, y ∈ X such that u(x) < u(y) the following is true:
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
= u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B).
Therefore, we have
νA(B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
ii) ⇒ iii) Now, suppose that the capacity ν is updated according to the Bayes
rule. Let the events A and B be N -unambiguous. Consider acts f, g ∈ F with
the following conditional preference relation: f ≺A g and f ≺B g. By computing
conditional Choquet expected utilities we get:∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]νA(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ A)
ν(A)∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA∪B = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]νA∪B(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ (A ∪B))
ν(A ∪B) .
Since the event A ∪ B is N -unambiguous we have ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ (A ∪ B)) =
ν((Aj, . . . , An)∩A)+ν((Aj, . . . , An)∩B) for any j = 2, . . . , n. Hence the conditional
Choquet integral
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA∪B is proportional to the sum of
∫
Ω
u ◦ fdνA and
∫
Ω
u ◦
fdνB. Therefore we obtain f ≺A∪B g.
iii) ⇒ i) Dynamic consistency directly implies conditional certainty equivalent
consistency.
Proposition 5.2. Consider the Full-Bayesian updating rule
νFBA (B) =
ν(A ∩B)
1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) .
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Since the conditional event A is N -unambiguous, ν(Ac∪B) = ν(Ac)+ν(A∩B) and
ν(Ac) + ν(A) = 1, therefore
νFBA (B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
Consider now the Dempster-Shafer updating rule,
νDSA (B) =
ν((A ∩B) ∪ Ac)− ν(Ac)
ν(A)
.
Since A is aN -unambiguous event, ν((A∩B)∪Ac)−ν(Ac) = ν(A∩B)+ν(Ac)−ν(Ac),
therefore
νDSA (B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
Since A is N -unambiguous event, then for any f ∈ F :∫
Ω
u ◦ fdν = u(x1) +
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)]ν(Aj, . . . , An)
= u(x1)(ν(A) + ν(A
c))
+
n∑
j=2
[u(xj)− u(xj−1)](ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ A) + ν((Aj, . . . , An) ∩ Ac))
=
∫
A
u ◦ f dν +
∫
Ac
u ◦ f dν
Thus, by definition of the h-Bayesian update: f A g iff fAh  gAh. For a N -
unambiguous event this is equivalent to
∫
A
u◦f dν ≤ ∫
A
u◦g dν which is independent
of h. So all the h-Bayesian updating rules coincide when the conditional event A
which is N -unambiguous.
Theorem 5.1. i) ⇒ ii) Let A ∈ A be an event on which dynamic consistency is
satisfied. It is well known (see Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2008)) that
dynamic consistency implies that the utility functions u and uA are the same up
to affine transformation. Let f = (A1, x1; . . . ;An, xn) be an act such that u(xi) <
u(xi+1) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. The Choquet expectation of f is taken with respect to
a rank dependent probability assignment mρ(f) with rank ρ given the act f , i.e.∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
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By solvability, there is an outcome x ∈ X such that f ∼A x. Without loss of
generality, we assume that f does not take the value x, i.e x 6= xi with i = 1, . . . , n.
Consider acts fAy for any y ∈ X. Let mρ(fAy) be a rank dependent probability
assignment associated with the act g. Let ν be a capacity such that ν(A)+ν(Ac) = 1
and let νA be a conditional capacity given A. In the first step we prove that
1
ν(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dνA.
In the second step, it is shown that for any act f ∈ F
1
ν(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dνA.
In the third step we conclude that that mρ(f)(A) = ν(A) for any act f ∈ F . There-
fore, for any ranking position of states, that is for all ranks ρ ∈ R, mρ(A) = ν(A)
and thus A is a N -unambiguous event.
Step 1. Since f ∼A x, by dynamic consistency we get fAy ∼ xA for any y ∈ X.
i) Let y be an outcome such that u(y) < u(x). Since
∫
Ω
u ◦ g dν = ∫
Ω
u ◦
(fAy) dmρ(fAy) we have∫
A
u ◦ fdmρ(fAy) + u(y)mρ(fAy)(Ac) = u(y)(1− ν(A)) + u(x)ν(A).
This equality is true for any such outcome y for which the ranking ρ given the
act fAy and the ranking ρ
′ given the act xAy are the same, i.e. ρ = ρ′. Thus
we get the following equality u(y)mρ(fAy)(A
c) = u(y)(1− ν(A)), which implies
that
mρ(fAy)(A) = v(A). (1)
Therefore we conclude that
∫
A
u ◦ fdmρ(fAy) = u(x)mρ(fAy)(A).
ii) Let y∗ be an outcome such that u(x) < u(y∗). Again, since
∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAy∗) dν =∫
Ω
u ◦ (fAy∗) dmρ(fAy∗) we have∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy∗) + u(y∗)mρ(fAy∗)(Ac) = u(y∗)(1− ν(A)) + u(x)ν(A).
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This equality is true for all outcomes y∗ which keep the same ranking, that
is the rank ρ associated with the act fAy
∗ and the rank ρ′ associated with
the act xAy
∗ are the same, i.e. ρ(ω) = ρ′(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. So we have
u(y∗)mρ(fAy∗)(A
c) = u(y∗)ν(Ac) which implies that
mρ(fAy∗)(A
c) = ν(Ac). (2)
Therefore we have
∫
A
u ◦ fdmρ(fAy∗) = u(x)(1− ν(Ac)).
iii) Consider now an act fAx. Let mρ(fAx) be a rank dependent probability as-
signment with rank ρ given the act fAx. Since the act f does not take the
value x, there is an outcome y ∈ X such that u(y) = u(x)−  and there is an
outcome y∗ ∈ X such that u(y∗) = u(x) +  and such that the act fAy and
the act fAy
∗ are comonotonic acts. This is possible by continuity of u. By
applying (1) and (2) to mρ(fAx) we can deduce that that mρ(fAx)(A) = ν(A)
and mρ(fAx)(A
c) = ν(Ac) and therefore ν(A) + ν(Ac) = 1.
Therefore, for any outcome y ∈ X and for any rank dependent probability as-
signment mρ(fAy) with rank ρ given the act fAy we have
u(x) =
1
v(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dvA.
Step 2. Since f ∼A x, dynamic consistency implies that f ∼ xAf . Let mρ(xAf) be a
rank dependent probability assignment for a rank ρ given the act xAf . Thus,
we have∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) +
∫
Ac
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Ac
u ◦ f dmρ(xAf) + u(x)mρ(xAf)(A).
Let us consider an act f ∗ ∈ F such that f(ω) = f ∗(ω) for any ω ∈ A, but
f(ω) 6= f ∗(ω) for at least one ω ∈ Ac. Moreover let f ∗ be comonotonic with
f and let xAf be comonotonic with xAf
∗. According to dynamic consistency
we have fAf
∗ ∼ xAf ∗. Therefore, we obtain the following equality∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) +
∫
Ac
u ◦ f ∗ dmρ(f) =
∫
Ac
u ◦ f ∗ dmρ(xAf) + u(x)mρ(xAf)(Ac),
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which implies that
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) = u(x)mρ(xAf)(A). Because dynamic con-
sistency is satisfied on the event A it is also satisfied on the complementary
event Ac. Thus, applying step 1 to Ac we get mρ(xAf)(A) = ν(A).
Step 3. From step 2 we have
u(x) =
1
v(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f),
and from step 1 we have for any y ∈ X
u(x) =
1
v(A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy).
Therefore, we have for any y ∈ X∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy)
Let us consider an act g that is f measurable and comonotonic with the act
f . Then
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Ω
u ◦ g dmρ(g). For any outcome y∗ there is an
outcome y such that gAy
∗ is fAy measurable and comonotonic with the act
fAy. By applying the same way of reasoning for act g as for act f in step 1
and in step 2 we obtain∫
A
u ◦ g dmρ(g) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
A
u ◦ g dmρ(gay∗) =
∫
A
u ◦ f dmρ(fAy)
This implies that on the algebra on A generated by f we obtain mρ(f) =
mρ(fAy). From step 1 we have that ν(A) = mρ(fAy)(A). Therefore we get
ν(A) = mρ(f)(A) for any act f ∈ F .
ii)⇒ i) See Proposition 5.1 ii) ⇒ iii).
Proposition 6.1. i) ⇒ ii) P-Dynamic Consistency follows directly: the capacity
on the filtration constructed from Z-unambiguous events is additive. Applying
the Bayes rule on it insures dynamic consistency for filtration measurable acts.
f ∼A x ⇔ fAx ∼ x is satisfied if the updating rule is h-Bayesian with h = x. In
proposition 6.2. we prove that all the h-Bayesian rules with h constant coincide on
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Z-unambiguous events. Since the Bayes rule corresponds to h-Bayesian update with
h = x, such that x is the worst possible outcome in X, the property of conditional
certainty equivalent consistency holds on Z-unambiguous events, when applying this
rule.
ii) ⇒ i) Let us suppose that conditional certainty equivalent consistency is
satisfied. Let f = yBx be a simple bet with u(x) < u(y). By Solvability there is
z ∈ X such that f ∼A z. Thus, by conditional certainty equivalent consistency we
have fAz ∼ z. After some computations we get:
u(z) = u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B)
u(z) = u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(z)(ν(Ac ∪ (B ∩ A))− ν(B)) + u(y)ν(B ∩ A)
Thus,
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
1− ν(Ac ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) .
as A is a Z-unambiguous event, then by the characterization of Z-unambiguous
events, we get 1 − ν(Ac ∪ B) + ν(B) = 1 − ν(Ac) − ν(A ∩ B) + ν(A ∩ B) = ν(E).
Thus, for any outcomes x, y ∈ X such that u(x) < u(y) the following is true:
u(z) =
u(x)(1− ν(Ac ∪B)) + u(y)ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
= u(x)(1− νA(B)) + u(y)νA(B).
Therefore, we have
νA(B) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(A)
.
Proposition 6.2. From the definition of Z-unambiguous events it follows directly
that all the h-Bayesian updating rules with h being constant act coincide with the
Bayes rule. If A is observed and B ⊂ A then the Full-Bayesian update is given by:
νFBA (B) =
ν(B)
1− ν(B ∪ Ac) + ν(B ∩ A)
Since A is Z-unambiguous then v(A ∪ Ec) = v(A) + v(Ec). Thus,
νFBA (B) =
ν(B)
ν(A)
.
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Theorem 6.1. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let P be the fixed filtration and Aj the atoms of this
filtration with 1 ≤ j ≤ n. From Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2007) we know
that conditional certainty equivalent consistency guarantees that the same util-
ity index u is used for conditional and unconditional prference relation. Let f =
(A1, x1; . . . ;An, xn) be a P-measurable act such that u(xj) < u(xj+1) with 1 ≤ j ≤
n − 1. The Choquet expectation of f is taken with respect to a rank dependent
probability assignment mρ(f) associated wtih the act f , i.e.∫
Ω
u ◦ f dν =
∫
Ω
u ◦ f dmρ(f).
Let us assume that Aci , with i 6= 1 and i 6= n, has occurred. In the first step we
show that
1
mρ(f)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dvAci .
Step 1. By solvability there is an outcome y ∈ X such that f ∼Aci y. Next we construct
an act g that is comonotonic with the act f . The construction is conducted
as follws. If u(y) ≤ u(xi−1), we define g on Aci as g = z on An with z ∈ X and
g = f otherwise. By choosing z properly, that is, such that u(z) > u(xn), we
obtain g such that g ∼Aci x with u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1). By continuity of u
this is possible. On the other hand, if u(xi+1) ≤ u(y) we define another act g
by decreasing x1, such that g ∼Aci x with u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1). Then the
acts f and g are comonotonic, because g is different of f only on the lowest
value of f , and this lowest value of g can only be lower than the lowest value
of f , or the highest value of f , and this highest value of g can only be higher
than the highest value of f . Therefore we get∫
Aci
u ◦ g dvAci =
∫
Aci
u ◦ g mρ(g),
where mρ(g) is the rank dependent probability assignment associated with the
act g. Now, we apply conditional certainty equivalent consistency and get
gAcix ∼ x. Since u(xi−1) < u(x) < u(xi+1), the act f and the act gAcix are
comonotonic. Thus their Choquet integrals are computed with respect to the
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same measure mρ(f), namely
∫
Ω
u ◦ (gAcix) dv =
∫
Ω
u ◦ (gAcix) dmρ(f). Thus, we
have
∫
Ω
u ◦ (gAcix) dv = u(x). Therefore we get
u(x) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ g dmρ(f) +mρ(f)(Ai)u(x)
Finally, we obtain
u(x) =
1
mρ(f)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ g dmρ(f) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ g dvAci ,
which is also true for the act f
1
mρ(f)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f) =
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dvAci .
Step 2. We show that the above result is true for any possible permutation of the
indices {2, . . . , n − 1} of the atoms {A2, . . . , An−1}. That is for any such
P-measurable act f ∗ the rank dependent probability assignment mρ(f∗) asso-
ciated with the act f ∗ is independent of the ranking position of the event Ai
provided that i 6= 1 and i 6= n. Consider an act f ∗ = (A1, x∗1; . . . ;An, x∗n)
such that f ∗ ∼Aci y for some outcome y ∈ X and such that u(xi) is between
u(x∗j) and u(x
∗
j+1). Consider also an another act f
∗∗ = (A1, x∗∗1 ; . . . ;An, x
∗∗
n )
with different rearrangements of atoms, such that u(xi) is between u(x
∗∗
j ) and
u(x∗∗j+1) and such that f
∗∗ ∼Aci y. Let mρ(f∗) and mρ(f∗∗) be a rank dependent
probability assignment associated with the act f ∗, respectively with f ∗∗. By
applying step 1 we obtain
1
mρ(f∗)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f∗) = 1
mρ(f∗∗)(Aci)
∫
Aci
u ◦ f dmρ(f∗∗) (1).
Now, we can vary the values of x∗1 and x
∗∗
1 , equality (1) remains true, provided
that f ∗ and f ∗∗ have still the same certainty equivalent conditional on the Aci ,
i.e there is some z such that f ∗ ∼Aci z and f ∗∗ ∼Aci z. Thus, it must be true
that mρ(f∗)(A
c
i) = mρ(f∗∗)(A
c
i). Then we have
mρ(f∗)(A
c
i) = 1−mρ(f∗)(Ai) = 1−v(Ai∪A∗j+1, . . . , An)+v(A∗j+1, . . . , An), (2)
and
mρ(f∗∗)(A
c
i) = 1−mρ(f∗∗)(Ai) = 1−v(Ai∪A∗∗j+1, . . . , An)+v(A∗∗j+1, . . . , An). (3)
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Equations (2) and (3) lead to the following
v(Ai∪A∗j+1, . . . , An)−v(A∗j+1, . . . , An) = v(Ai∪A∗∗j+1, . . . , An)−v(A∗∗j+1, . . . , An).
The last equation is true for any f . Let Ai = E with i 6= 1 and i 6= n.
Moreovere, let F = (A∗j+1, . . . , An) let G = (A
∗∗
j+1, . . . , An). The left hand
side of the equation is true if (Ai ∪ A∗j+1, . . . , An) − (A∗j+1, . . . , An) 6= 1, i.e.
v(F ) 6= 0 and v(F ∪ E) 6= 1. The right hand side of the equation is true if
(Ai ∪ A∗∗j+1, . . . , An) − (A∗∗j+1, . . . , An) 6= 1, i.e. v(G) 6= 0 and v(G ∪ E) 6= 1.
Thus, we get
v(F ∪ E)− v(F ) = v(G ∪ E)− v(G).
Step 3. Since P-dynamic consistency holds on the algebra generated by the filtration
P the capacity ν is additive on this algebra.
Case 1. There exists an event F ∈ P such that v(F ) 6= 0 and v(F ∪E) 6= 1. Thus,
by additivity of v on P we get v(F ∪ E)− v(F ) = v(E). Then from the
result in step 1 we conclude that v(A∪E) = v(A)+ v(E) for all A ⊂ Ec.
Case 2 Suppose that there exists no such event F and then let us assume at least
three atoms in P . There exists E ′ and E ′′ in P such that E = E ′ ∪ E ′′
and the complements of E ′ and E ′′ are not atoms in P . Therefore, we
can apply case 1 to them obtaining
ν(F ∪ E)− ν(F ) = ν(F ∪ E ′ ∪ E ′′)− ν(F ∪ E ′) + ν(F ∪ E ′)− ν(F )
= ν(E ′) + ν(E ′′)
= ν(E)
Therefore, we have v(A ∪ E) = v(A) + v(E) for all A ⊂ Ec.
By applying step 1, step 2 and step 3 to the complementary event, Ec, we can
conclude that E and Ec are Z-unambiguous events.
(ii) ⇒ (i). The converse follows immendiatly from the Proposition 6.1.
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